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Summary
We present a theoretical analysis of different types of active labor market policies in the con-
text of a search-matching model. We find that labor market training is effective in bringing down
unemployment while public employment services and subsidized jobs are not effective at all. This
theoretical finding is confirmed in an explorative empirical analysis using data from 20 OECD
countries.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Unemployment rates are increasing. Average unemployment rate in the
OECD increased to 7.8% April 2009 from 5.6% 1 year earlier and the expec-
tation is that a further increase lies ahead of us. Naturally, governments
worry about the level of unemployment and consider various policy instru-
ments to bring unemployed back to work. Among the policy alternatives
active labor market policies (ALMP) are important. ALMP aim at bring-
ing unemployed back to work by improving the functioning of the labor
market in various ways. ALMP include programs such as public employ-
ment services, labor market training and subsidized employment. The 1994
OECD Jobs study recommends governments to “strengthen the emphasis on
active labor market policies and reinforce their effectiveness” (OECD 1994).
Recent studies, however, are not very optimistic about the benefits of many
∗ The authors thank Andrea Bassanini and Romain Duval for making their data available. Jan
Boone acknowledges financial support from NWO through a Vici grant.
∗∗ Department of Economics, CentER, TILEC, Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands,
e-mail: j.boone@uvt.nl.
∗∗∗ CEPR, London, UK.
† Corresponding author: Department of Economics, CentER, Tilburg University, P.O. Box
90153, 5000 LE, Tilburg, The Netherlands, e-mail: vanours@uvt.nl.
†† Department of Economics, University of Melbourne, Parkville, VIC, Australia.
294 JAN BOONE, JAN C. VAN OURS
of these programs. In the reassessment of the Jobs Strategy the OECD con-
cludes “that well-designed programs can have a positive impact (...) but that
many existing programs have failed to do so" (OECD 2006). If one would
draw a general conclusion from the empirical studies based on micro data it
would be that the effects of ALMP on the job finding rates are rather small.
An important drawback of a lot of ALMP is that they stimulate workers to
reduce their search efforts instead of increasing them. This is due to the so-
called locking-in effect (see for example Van Ours 2004). Other effects are
important too. What is effective for an individual unemployed worker may
not be effective in terms of the aggregate level of unemployment. One reason
for this may be crowding out. If a training program brings an unemployed
worker back to work more quickly at the expense of another unemployed
worker finding a job more slowly the training program is not very efficient.
Another reason for the differences between individual and aggregate effects is
that a training program may make workers more attractive for firms, which
stimulates job creation. Or it may be that a training program induces a bet-
ter match between a worker and a job. In that case job tenure will increase
causing a reduction of unemployment through a reduced inflow into unem-
ployment. This effect is overlooked if one focuses on job finding rates.
There are many evaluation studies. Kluve and Schmidt (2002) use the out-
comes of 53 recent evaluation studies to perform a regression where each pro-
gram represents 1 datapoint. The effects of ALMP are explained by the type
of program, the study design (experimental versus non-experimental), the tim-
ing (1980s vs. 1990s) and the macroeconomic environment. The authors con-
clude that programs with a large training content seem to be most likely
to improve employment probability. Furthermore, they conclude that both
direct job creation and employment subsidies in the public sector almost
always seem to fail. Kluve (2007) follows up on this and presents an anal-
ysis of about 100 evaluation studies of active labor market policy programs
in Europe, most of them operating after 1990. He finds that the effectiveness
of programs is quite independent of contextual factors such as labor market
institutions and macroeconomic environment. Traditional training programs
appear to have at most a modest effect on transitions from unemployment to
work private sectors incentive programs. Direct employment programs in the
public sector are rarely effective and frequently detrimental for the employ-
ment prospects of participants. Card et al. (2009) present an assessment of
ALMP based on approximately 200 European and US microeconometrics
evaluation studies. The authors find that subsidized public sector employ-
ment programs are relatively ineffective. Job search assistance programs have
a favorable impact especially in the short run while classroom and on-the-job
training programs are not favorable in the short-run, but have more positive
impacts after 2 years.
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This paper presents a theoretical analysis of the effectiveness of active
labor market policies. We analyze the effects of subsidized jobs, public employ-
ment services and labor market training. In this model we introduce some
parameters capturing active labor market policies by the government. Train-
ing increases the expected productivity of the worker. The government can
stimulate training by subsidizing training costs. We also take into account
an alternative route to higher productivity. This is through learning on-the-
job. The government can stimulate the on-the-job training route by subsi-
dizing the creation of vacancies. Simply because there are more vacancies,
unemployed will flow more quickly into jobs and through learning by doing
they flow from low productivity to high-productivity jobs (hence the tran-
sition from unemployment to high-productivity jobs happens more quickly).
Finally, the functioning of the labor market can be influenced through public
employment services. These services can influence the labor market because
matching becomes more efficient. Our theoretical analysis helps us to explain
the dichotomy in the empirical results with micro studies often finding no
effect of labor market programs – in particular training programs – while
macro studies conclude that these programs do reduce the unemployment
rate. Further, we address the empirical puzzle of micro-evaluation studies
based on short-term performance of job-related training programs that do
not find any strong impact while studies based on longer observations win-
dows tend to present a more optimistic picture (OECD 2005). We find that
our model explains the empirical results best if (i) the job finding rate is
hardly affected by ALMP, which is consistent with micro studies, and (ii)
the main effect of ALMP on unemployment is via job duration. The train-
ing component of ALMP scores best because it directly affects this channel
while the other measures have only an indirect effect on job duration.
In our explorative empirical analysis we try to find support for our theo-
retical predictions. We analyze the effects of ALMP on unemployment rates
using aggregate time series – cross section data from 20 OECD countries. We
find that expenditures on labor market training have an impact on the unem-
ployment rate. Public employment services and subsidized jobs do not seem
to affect unemployment rates.
The set-up of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we present our theoret-
ical model. In Section 3 we discuss our data, the set-up of our analysis and
we present parameter estimates. Section 4 concludes.
2 THE MODEL
2.1 The Structure of the Model
We focus on three types of ALMP: training of unemployed workers (TU),
subsidized employment (SE) and public employment services (PES). The
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relationships between specific types of ALMP and parameters in the
theoretical model are the following. The effect of training is modeled as a
subsidy to training costs of unemployed workers. What we have in mind here
is two things. First, placement workers help unemployed workers to find the
most suitable courses for them such that they do not waste time and effort
enrolling in less effective courses. Second, the government sometimes cre-
ates courses that are directly relevant for certain groups of unemployed. This
is less costly for the unemployed than doing bits and pieces from different
courses, none of which is targeted at them. The effect of employment services
is modeled as a subsidy to workers’ search costs. Here the placement workers
help to filter all vacancy information such that only the vacancies most rel-
evant for an unemployed worker come up. This reduces the search cost for
the unemployed. Finally, subsidized employment is modeled as a subsidy for
the value of the match of low productivity jobs.
The model introduces two channels through which ALMP can potentially
reduce unemployment. First, government measures can increase the job find-
ing rate, that is the speed with which the unemployed flow into employment.
Second, through training the unemployed can get better jobs. In particular,
we assume that high skilled jobs pay a higher wage and are less likely to be
destroyed. Hence if ALMP causes more unemployed to end up in high skilled
jobs, it reduces unemployment by decreasing the flow from employment to
unemployment. It turns out that the effects of ALMP on the job finding
rate are ambiguous theoretically. Moreover, we know from micro studies that
the effects on the job finding rate are very small indeed. Hence we focus on
the mechanism via the quality of the job and the flow from employment to
unemployment. Focussing on this effect, we derive the three basic findings
mentioned above including the interaction effect of unemployment benefits
and TU on the unemployment rate.
Our model is in the tradition of the search and matching literature, see
Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) for an overview. An agent who is unem-
ployed has to decide on two things: search intensity s and training inten-
sity e. Search intensity s for a worker yields a disutility of γ (s) and a prob-
ability of finding a job of sm (θ), where m (θ) denotes the rate with which
a worker is matched with a firm as a function of labor market tightness.
Labor market tightness θ is defined as the ratio of vacancies v over effec-
tive search by the unemployed u: θ ≡ v
su
. Training intensity e yields a dis-
utility χ (e) and (conditional on finding a job) a high productivity job with
probability e ∈〈0,1〉 and a low productivity job with probability 1−e, where
χ (0)= 0, χ ′ (e)> 0, χ ′′ (e)> 0 and χ ′ (0)= 0. The search effort function γ (s)
features γ (0)=0, γ ′(s)>0, γ ′′ (s)>0 and γ ′ (0)=0. These are fairly standard
assumptions for disutility functions.
Let yh (yl) denote a worker’s output in the high (low) productivity job.
Further, let δl denote the exogenous rate by which a low skilled match
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dissolves. We assume that the corresponding rate for a high skilled job is
smaller, δh <δl . Note that this is consistent with empirical evidence that job
separation rates decline with the skill of workers (see for example OECD
1997). Finally, ε≥0 denotes the exogenous probability that a worker in a low
productivity job, through learning by doing, ends up in a high productivity
job.




b −κ − (1−σγ )γ (s)− (1−σχ )χ(e)
+sm (θ) [eVh + (1− e) Vl − Vu ]
}
(1)
ρVh =wh + δh (Vu − Vh) (2)
ρVl =wl + ε (Vh − Vl)+ δl (Vu − Vl) (3)
where ρ denotes the discount rate, Vu the expected discounted value of being
unemployed, Vh (Vl ) the value of having a high (low) productivity job. The
policy instruments σγ , σχ ∈ [0,1] denote the reduction in search costs due to
PES and the reduction in workers’ training costs due to TU. The parame-
ter κ ≥0 denotes the negative effect (if any) of being in an ALMP program.
This can be a stigma effect or the disutility of being monitored in a training
or PES program. Hence κ =0 if there is no program to participate in.
The value of being unemployed ρVu equals the sum of four terms. There is
unemployment benefit level b reduced by the effort costs of search and train-
ing and the stigma disutility if the worker participates in ALMP. Then there
is the probability sm(θ) of finding a job and leaving unemployment. With
probability e (1− e) the worker finds a high (low) productivity job with cor-
responding expected discounted pay offs Vh (Vl ). The value of having a high
productivity job ρVh equals the wage wh you earn until (with probability δh)
the match is dissolved and you become unemployed again. The value of a
low productivity job ρVl is comparable except that now there is a probabil-
ity ε that by learning by doing the low productivity job turns into a high
productivity job. Hence we assume that there is no ex ante variation in skills
(everyone has the same disutility function χ(e)). Further, if a worker loses his
job and does not invest in training (e) while unemployed, he loses his skills.
The participation of agents in the labor market is determined by the value
of their outside opportunities ω. Outside opportunities include value of leisure,
home production, taking care of the children etc. We assume that ω is dis-
tributed on [ω, ω¯] with distribution function F(ω) and we normalize the size
of the population at 1 (i.e. F (ω¯) = 1). An agent only joins the labor mar-
ket if the value of doing so exceeds the outside opportunity of staying at
home: ρVu ≥ω. Hence we assume that people cannot find a job right away
when they are outside of the labor force. If an agent wants to work, he first
becomes unemployed and then finds a job. Because of this assumption, the
relevant comparison is between ω and ρVu . It follows that the participation
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rate (fraction of the population participating in the labor market) is given
by l = F(ρVu). Further total unemployment is given by F(ρVu)u and the
employment population rate equals ep = F(ρVu)(1−u).
Turning to the other side of the labor market, the Bellman equations for
firms can be written as follows.
ρ Jv =−c + m(θ)
θ
(eJh + (1− e)Jl − Jv) (4)
ρ Jh = yh −wh + δh (Jv − Jh) (5)
ρ Jl = yl +σyl −wl + ε (Jh − Jl)+ δl (Jv − Jl) (6)
where Jv is the value for a firm of posting a vacancy, Jh (Jl ) denotes the
value of the firm matched with a worker in the high (low) productivity state.
The cost of opening a vacancy equals c. The probability that the firm’s
vacancy is matched with a worker equals m(θ)
θ
and is decreasing in tightness









. The probabilities δl , δh and ε are the same as the
ones above in the worker’s problem. The job subsidy given by the govern-
ment takes the form here of increasing the value of the match in the low
productivity state by σyl . We assume that the government does not subsi-
dize high productivity jobs, as indeed governments target such subsidies at
the bottom of the labor market. As usual, we assume that there is free entry
in posting vacancies and hence Jv =0.
Finally, we have the following equations of motion for the unemployment
rate, percentage of participating workers in high productivity jobs and low
productivity jobs.
u˙t = δhnht + δlnlt − st m (θt )ut (7)
n˙ht =−δhnht + εnlt + st m (θt ) et ut (8)
nlt =1− (ut +nht ) (9)
Note that because of the assumption of linear vacancy costs, the size of the
labor market F (ρVu) has no effect on the unemployment and employment
rates. In steady state the unemployment rate is given by
u = 1
1+ sm(θ)
δh(ε+δl ) (δh + ε+ e (δl − δh))
(10)
Hence an increase in the job finding rate sm (θ) and in the training effort
e reduce the steady state unemployment level. The former through increasing
the flow from unemployment to employment, the latter through reducing the
flow in the opposite direction.
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2.2 Solving The Model
In this section, we solve the model for search effort s, training effort e and
the participation rate F (ρVu). To do this we start by deriving the wages for
high and low productivity jobs.
We assume that workers and firms Nash bargain about the wage in each
state. That is wh and wl solve respectively
max
wh
(Vh − Vu)1−β (Jh)β (11)
max
wl
(Vl − Vu)1−β (Jl)β (12)
This leads to the following well known expressions for the wage rates.
Lemma 1 The wages equal





With these wages, we can determine Vu, Vh, Vl , Jh and Jl . The next result
shows the equations determining s, e, ρVu and θ .
Lemma 2 The first order conditions for training and search intensity of an indi-






















































b − (1−σγ )γ (s)− (1−σχ )χ(e)−κ + sm(θ) (1−β)⎡
⎣ yh−ρVu
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As one can verify, these equations follow from the Bellman equations
above. First, consider the effects of the instruments σγ , σχ and σyl on the job
finding rate sm (θ). We argue that these effects are theoretically ambiguous:
the effect can be positive and negative depending on which effect dominates.
Therefore we should not be surprised if no clear effect is found in the data
of these measures on the job finding rate. As σγ is raised, the marginal costs
of search go down. Thus there is a tendency for the unemployed to search
more. However, the rise in σγ also reduces the level of search costs and hence
raises the value of being unemployed. This leads to a locking in effect. As
being unemployed is not so bad anymore, there is less incentive to escape
unemployment through search and/or training. The locking in effect leads to
lower search and training intensities which both tend to raise unemployment.
A similar ambiguity is found in the case of TU. On the one hand, a rise in
σχ reduces marginal training costs and hence stimulates training effort. Since
this raises the probability of finding a high wage job, it also stimulates search.
On the other hand, the following locking in effect is present. By reducing the
level of training costs, the value of being unemployed goes up. This reduces
the incentive to find a job. Finally, consider SE, parameterized here as a rise
in σyl . This raises the pay off in low wage jobs and hence stimulates search.
But by reducing the wage differential between high and low skilled jobs, it
reduces training intensity. This decreases the probability of getting a high
wage job, an effect that reduces search and the job finding rate.
These ambiguous theoretical effects of ALMP instruments on the job find-
ing rate are reminiscent of empirical studies on micro data which do not find
strong effects either of ALMP on the job finding rate. These studies are dis-
cussed in more detail below. Beside the ambiguous theoretical results above,
another reason for such empirical findings can be that search is rather inelas-
tic (i.e. γ ′′ (s) is big).
Since the empirical literature indicates (and we find this in the data as
well) that some ALMP instruments reduce unemployment, but do not wish
to rely on a theoretical explanation that is contradicted by micro evidence
(which rules out that ALMP instruments reduce unemployment by raising the
job finding rate), we analyze the model above under the assumption that the
effects on the job finding rate sm (θ) are small. Put differently, we assume
that the effects of ALMP on the job finding rate are dominated by the effects
outlined below which focus on the quality of the job found by the unem-
ployed. To do this, we assume that search s¯, tightness θ¯ and thus the job





are exogenously fixed. The following proposition charac-
terizes the effects of ALMP and unemployment benefits in this case.1 Proof
of the proposition can be found in the Appendix.



































∂σχ∂b <0 if χ
′′′ (e)>0 is big enough.
Hence all three programs increase the value of being unemployed. How-
ever, if the program causes a stigma effect, it reduces the value of being
unemployed. Similarly, an increase in the unemployment benefit raises the
value of being unemployed. These effects of σγ and σχ on Vu are the locking
in effects described above.





is given) on the unemployment rate. The effect on the
unemployment rate has the opposite sign from the effect on training e since
more training leads to a higher probability of finding a high skilled job which
has a lower separation rate. Hence unemployment goes down, as e goes up
by reducing the outflow from employment into unemployment.
An increase in σγ does not directly affect the incentive to train, but it does
raise the value of being unemployed. As the value of being unemployed is
increased, getting a job with a higher separation rate is less of a problem.
Hence the incentive to train is reduced. Via this mechanism PES raises unem-
ployment. To the extent that participating in a PES program introduces a
stigma effect (κ goes up), it tends to reduce unemployment by decreasing the
value of being unemployed and therefore stimulating training.
Introducing SE for low skilled jobs, reduces the incentive to get a high
skilled job by decreasing the wage differential. As shown in Lemma1, wh −wl
1 We use the comparative statics in the proposition to understand the patterns we find in
the data. Thus we do not consider explanations which start from an exogenous change in,
say, the government’s preferences which leads the government to optimally change its instru-
ments. This would introduce an endogeneity in the instruments that is beyond the scope of
this paper. Instead, we view governments as inventing and experimenting with different ALMP
instruments. In this sense, we view changes in the instruments as exogenous.
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falls with σyl . Hence training effort goes down and unemployment goes up.
It is not clear whether there would be a stigma (κ) effect in this case work-
ing in the opposite direction. Similarly, an increase in unemployment benefits
reduces training and hence raises unemployment.
Further, consider the effect of TU on training intensity. By reducing the
marginal costs of training, an increase in σχ raises training effort. On the
other hand, σχ also reduces the level of training costs and hence raises
the value of being unemployed. This tends to reduce training effort. As we
show in the Appendix, under the assumptions made above, the former effect
always dominates the latter. The intuition for this is discounting (ρ >0).2
The direct reduction of marginal training costs due to the increase in σχ
happens now and is not discounted. The increase in Vu which reduces the
future (after the worker has found a job) wage differential wh −wl comes in
in a discounted way and hence weighs less. Therefore the direct effect out-
weighs the indirect effect of σχ . Hence, a rise in σχ stimulates training and
reduces unemployment. And because σχ raises Vu and thus the gross par-
ticipation rate F (ρVu), we find that TU unambiguously raises the employ-
ment population rate. In the other cases, we do not get such an unambigu-
ous result. Not even if we use the stigma effect κ. The effect of κ is to reduce
Vu and thereby stimulate training, but it also directly reduces participation
F (ρVu).
Summarizing, focussing on the quality of the job and assuming that the
effects of ALMP on the job finding rate are small, we find the following
effects. First, TU by directly stimulating training effort and by raising the
value of being unemployed reduces the unemployment rate and raises the
employment-population rate. The direct effect of PES on training is to reduce
it, thereby raising unemployment. If PES causes a stigma effect, it reduces
the value of being unemployment, thereby stimulating training and reducing
unemployment. However, the reduction in Vu then reduces participation and
hence we get an ambiguous effect on the employment-population rate. The
direct effect of SE on training is to reduce it and hence it tends to raise unem-
ployment. But the effect on the employment-population rate is ambiguous,
since SE raises Vu and hence stimulates participation.
Finally, we find that an increase in b makes the training subsidy more
effective in reducing unemployment. The main effect is that by raising b,
training effort goes down ( ∂e∂b < 0) and therefore the unemployed moves to
a part of the effort cost function χ (.) that is more elastic (here we use the
assumption that χ ′′′ (e) > 0). This effect dominates other effects if χ ′′′ (e) is
big enough. The idea is that if the worker invests already a lot in training,









>0 which follows from ρ >0.
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a subsidy will increase this effort further but not by much. The marginal
training costs are already so high, that further increases in effort are hard to
realize. But higher unemployment benefits imply a lower training effort and
hence there is more room to increase effort further. Another effect is that the





δh(ε+δl ) (δl − δh)(
1+ sm(θ)
δh(ε+δl ) (δh + ε+ e (δl − δh))
)2 (19)
is big in absolute value if the denominator is small. The denominator is small
if e is small, which is exactly what a high value of b establishes. In other
words, if e is small, unemployment is rather high and reducing it is relatively
easy. Hence for higher b the increase in e (due to a rise in σχ ) has a bigger
effect on unemployment u.
3 AN EXPLORATIVE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
3.1 Previous Studies
Empirical work on the macroeconomic effects of ALMP is rare. And, often
no distinction is made between types of ALMP. Instead, the focus is on total
ALMP-expenditures. The equation of interest usually exploits cross-country
variation in unemployment and ALMP-expenditures. In a general form, such
an equation can be specified as follows:
uit =αi +αt +β0 +β1xit +β2yit +β3zit + εi t (20)
where uit is the unemployment rate (unemployment as a percentage of the
labor force) in country i and calendar year (or time period) t . Furthermore,
the αi represent country fixed effects, the αt represent calendar year fixed
effects, x is a vector of labor market institutions, y refers to ALMP-expen-
ditures and z is a vector of macroeconomic indicators representing cyclical
influences. Finally, εi t is the error term. With one exception which will be dis-
cussed below, none of the empirical studies uses a fixed effects specification.
There is a limited number of empirical studies using cross-country time
series information to establish the effects of ALMP. Scarpetta (1996) uses
annual data from 17 countries over the 1983–1993 period. As the ALMP-
variable he uses the expenditures on active measures per unemployed per-
son relative to GDP per capita. He finds that ALMP have a negative impact
on the unemployment rate but there are also indications of large substitu-
tion and displacement effects on employment. There is a positive correlation
between ALMP and the employment-population rates, which indicates that
these policies have a positive effect on labor force participation by keeping
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otherwise discouraged workers in the labor force. Elmeskov et al. (1998) ana-
lyze annual data from 19 countries over the period 1983–1995. Again the
ALMP variable is the public spending on ALMP per unemployed person
relative to GDP per capita. The authors conclude that ALMP have a sta-
tistically significant negative effect on the unemployment rate. Nickell and
Layard (1999) analyze 6 years period averages from 20 OECD countries over
the period 1983–1994. The ALMP-variable is the ALMP spending per unem-
ployed person as a percentage of GDP per member of the labor force. The
authors find that ALMP have a negative effect on long-term unemployment
but no significant effect on the employment-population rate. Blanchard and
Wolfers (2000) have 5 years averages data on 20 OECD countries and ana-
lyze the period 1960–1995. As they use a time-invariant country-specific aver-
age ALMP-variable and include country fixed effects they cannot identify the
direct effect of ALMP on the unemployment rate. Instead, they study the
interaction between ALMP and shocks concluding that higher expenditures
on ALMP reduce the effects of shocks on unemployment.
The studies that have been performed do not all point in the same direc-
tion. Scarpetta (1996), Elmeskov et al. (1998), and Nickell and Layard (1999)
find that ALMP reduce the unemployment rate. Only Scarpetta (1996) finds
that ALMP increase the employment-population rate.
3.2 Data
The OECD has systematic information about ALMP since 1985. The expen-
ditures are measured as a percentage of GDP and as shown in Table 1 there
are clear differences between countries. Whereas Japan only spends 0.03% of
GDP on labor market training, Denmark spends 0.63%. While the US spends
0.06% of GDP on PES and countries like Greece, Portugal and Spain spend
0.9% of GDP on this ALMP, The Netherlands spend 0.34% of their GDP
on PES.3 Also with respect to expenditures on subsidized jobs the differences
between countries are quite large. The US spend 0.01% of GDP on subsi-
dized jobs, while Belgium spends 0.72% of their GDP on subsidized jobs.
These differences appear both in terms of levels as well as developments. In
Denmark for example public expenditures on labor market training went up
from 0.37% in the second half of the 1980s to 0.99% in the second half of the
1990s. In the same time in Ireland these expenditures went down from 0.53
to 0.21%. In Sweden the expenditures first went up from 0.51% in the second
half of the 1980s to 0.82% in the early 1990s and went back again to 0.55%
in the second half in the 1990s. At the lower end for example is Japan where
3 Note that one should be cautious in interpreting results for PES since they include also
administrative costs. An increase in efficiency through cuts in red tape will reduce expenditures
on PES but not the potential effectiveness.
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Other Total Time period
1. Australia 0.07 0.17 0.13 0.11 0.48 1985–2001
2. Austria 0.13 0.12 0.06 0.07 0.38 1985–2002
3. Belgium 0.24 0.19 0.72 0.15 1.30 1985–2001
4. Canada 0.24 0.22 0.04 0.03 0.53 1985–2001
5. Denmark 0.63 0.10 0.30 0.44 1.47 1986–2000
6. Finland 0.36 0.13 0.52 0.24 1.25 1985–2002
7. France 0.32 0.15 0.25 0.36 1.08 1985–2001
8. Germany 0.35 0.22 0.31 0.30 1.18 1985–2002
9. Ireland 0.37 0.20 0.43 0.44 1.44 1985–91,
1994–96, 2001
10. Italy 0.07 0.02 0.18 0.06 0.33 1991–2001
11. Japan 0.03 0.16 0.07 0.01 0.27 1987–2001
12. Netherlands 0.34 0.34 0.17 0.66 1.51 1985–2002
13. New Zealand 0.34 0.13 0.19 0.12 0.78 1985–2001
14. Norway 0.16 0.14 0.12 0.44 0.86 1985–2002
15. Portugal 0.21 0.09 0.07 0.29 0.66 1986–2000
16. Spain 0.15 0.09 0.34 0.09 0.67 1985–2002
17. Sweden 0.55 0.26 0.42 0.81 2.04 1985–2001
18. Switzerland 0.07 0.10 0.08 0.16 0.41 1985–2002
19. United Kingdom 0.10 0.18 0.08 0.21 0.57 1985–2001
20. United States 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.07 0.20 1985–2001
Source: Bassanini and Duval (2006).
the expenditures on labor market training stayed constant at a low level of
0.03%. Similar differences occur with respect to the public expenditures on
subsidized jobs. In Belgium these expenditures were always at a high 0.6–
0.8% of GDP while in Ireland and Sweden there was a major increase from
about 0.25% in the second half of the 1980s to 0.8–0.85% in the second half
of the 1990s.
An overview of the dependent variable in our analysis, the unemployment
rate of prime age workers (aged 25–54), is given in Table 2.4 As shown over
the period of analysis there is a wide variation in the unemployment rate
ranging from a low 2.9% in Switzerland to as high as 15.4% in Spain. We
estimate the parameters of Eq. 1, where we investigate the effects of the addi-
tional labor market institutions, namely unemployment benefits, taxes, union
density and employment protection legislation (EPL). Table 2 gives an over-
4 Alternatively we used the unemployment rate of age group 15–64 years but the results were
very similar.
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TABLE 2 – CHARACTERISTICS OF LABOR MARKETS; AVERAGES
Unempl. rate Repl. rate Taxes Union density EPL High Corp.
1. Australia 6.1 25.5 15.3 35.5 1.0 0.35
2. Austria 3.6 30.5 25.8 43.0 2.2 1.0
3. Belgium 7.7 40.6 39.0 54.2 2.9 1.0
4. Canada 8.0 17.9 19.6 32.0 0.8 0.0
5. Denmark 6.5 55.8 32.3 76.1 1.9 1.0
6. Finland 7.8 35.6 37.9 75.5 2.2 1.0
7. France 9.3 37.6 38.4 10.5 2.9 0.0
8. Germany 6.9 27.4 34.1 29.9 2.9 1.0
9. Ireland 12.8 28.9 27.6 48.9 0.9 0.8
10. Italy 8.3 22.2 40.3 36.9 3.1 0.8
11. Japan 2.6 10.3 16.4 24.1 2.0 1.0
12. Netherlands 5.9 53.3 36.7 25.1 2.6 1.0
13. New Zealand 5.5 29.8 19.3 37.3 1.0 0.4
14. Norway 3.2 39.5 26.2 56.4 2.8 1.0
15. Portugal 4.8 35.0 27.0 31.5 3.9 0.0
16. Spain 15.4 35.5 32.5 13.5 3.4 0.0
17. Sweden 4.5 27.2 42.0 81.3 2.9 0.0
18. Switzerland 2.9 28.7 18.1 23.1 1.1 1.0
19. United Kingdom 7.0 18.0 24.3 37.0 0.6 0.0
20. United States 4.6 12.5 24.1 14.9 0.2 0.0
Note: the averages are calculated over the time periods presented in Table 1.
Source: Bassanini and Duval (2006).
view of country averages for these labor market institutions. As shown unem-
ployment benefits – in terms of replacement rate – vary from a low 10.3%
in Japan to a high 55.8% in Denmark. Tax rates vary from a low 24.1% in
the United States to a high 42% in Sweden. Union density has a wide range
from a low 10.5% in France to a high 81.3% in Sweden. The indicator for
EPL varies from a low 0.2 in the US to a high 3.9 in Portugal. Finally, we
use a dummy variable for high corporation in wage bargaining. As shown in
a lot of countries this dummy variable has a value of 0 or 1 over the whole
calendar time range indicating that no change occurred.
3.3 Parameter Estimates
As indicated before, in the analysis of how ALMP affects the unemployment
rate an important problem, perhaps the main problem, is the possible endo-
geneity of ALMP. ALMP may have a negative effect on the unemployment
rate but increasing unemployment may induce the government to expand
expenditures on ALMP. As is clear from the literature overview there is no
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standard solution to the endogeneity problem. Often the problem has been
addressed by using country averages of ALMP spending and assuming that
the country effects are randomly distributed. This is unlikely to be correct
since the country effects will not be independent from other country charac-
teristics like labor market institutions. We will use an alternative solution. We
use the shares of separate ALMP categories in total expenditures as explan-
atory variables. Whereas the level of expenditures may be subject to an end-
ogeneity bias the shares are not. After all, there is no particular reason why
an increase in unemployment would automatically lead to a different distri-
bution of ALMP expenditures.5




where tr is the expenditures on labor market training, al is the sum of all
ALMP expenditures and ali is the average of this variable over the period.
The shares of expenditures on PES and subsidized jobs are defined accord-
ingly. The time series variation allows us to use country-specific fixed effects.6
The first column of Table 3 shows the parameter estimates. Unemploy-
ment benefits and taxes have a positive effect on the unemployment rate
while high corporate wage bargaining has a negative effect. Union density
and employment protection do not have a significant effect on the unemploy-
ment rate.7 The main results concern the effects of the ALMP expenditures.
As shown, the share of expenditures on labor market training has a negative
effect on the unemployment rate. For the share of expenditures on PES we
also find a negative effect, but the relevant parameter is insignificantly dif-
ferent from zero; the share of expenditures on subsidized jobs has a positive
sign. So, the parameter estimates indicate that labor market training is the
most effective ALMP in terms of reducing unemployment. This is confirmed
in the second column of Table 3 which only contains the share of ALMP
on training expenditures. Introducing the interaction between the share of
expenditures on labor market training and unemployment benefits we find an
additional significant negative effect (see column 3 of Table 3). Table 3 also
shows that the parameter of the labor market institutions are not affected
much by the change in the ALMP variables.
5 Bassanini and Duval (2006) use a more traditional instrumental variable approach finding
similar results as we do.
6 Because of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the re-unification of Germany for Finland,
Germany and Sweden separate country fixed effects are used for the time periods 1985–1992
and 1993–2002. Therefore, for 20 countries we estimate 23 fixed effects.
7 Studies like for example Belot and van Ours (2001, 2004) and Nickell et al. (2005) do
find significant effects of employment protection and union density, but they consider a much
longer calendar time period (from 1960 onwards).
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TABLE 3 – PARAMETER ESTIMATES
(1) (2) (3)
UB Replacement rate 0.11 (4.2) 0.14 (5.6) 0.19 (7.3)
Tax wedge 0.21 (6.5) 0.21 (6.6) 0.19 (6.2)
Union density 0.03 (1.4) 0.02 (0.7) 0.03 (1.2)
Employment protection legislation −0.40 (1.2) −0.35 (1.1) −0.44 (1.4)
Level of wage bargaining −2.04 (5.3) −1.91 (4.9) −2.06 (5.6)
ALMP expenditure shares
Training −0.17 (5.4) −0.14 (6.1) −0.09 (3.5)
Subsidized jobs 0.25 (3.2) – –
Public employment services −0.00 (0.5) – –
Interaction
Training×UB Repl. rate – – −0.03 (5.0)
Note: The estimates are based on 314 observations of 20 countries using calendar
year fixed effects and 23 country fixed effects; see Appendix B for a description of
the variables; absolute t-statistics in parentheses.
Finally, if we estimate Eq. 1 for the employment population rate (instead
of the unemployment rate) as the variable to be explained we find that TU is
the only instrument to raise participation significantly, which is in line with
the theory presented above.
4 CONCLUSIONS
We present a theoretical analysis of different types of active labor market
policies intended to bring the unemployed back to work. To explain the
dichotomy between empirical studies based on micro data that usually find
small
(if any) effects of training on the job finding rate and macro studies that
show that labor market training can be effective we perform a theoretical
analysis. In our theoretical search-matching model we investigate under which
conditions it makes sense to introduce training programs and under which
conditions alternative ways to build up human capital of unemployed work-
ers should be preferred. We show that even if a training program does not
influence the job finding rate it may still reduce the unemployment rate
because of its effect on the job separation rate. By improving the quality of
the match between worker and job the inflow into unemployment is reduced.
This may also explain the empirical puzzle that longer term evaluation studies
are more positive about job-related training programs than short-term eval-
uation studies. Short-term studies focus on job finding rates while in longer
term studies the effects on job duration have a bigger impact.
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Our explorative empirical analysis, based on data from 20 OECD coun-
tries, confirms these results. We find that an increase in expenditures on labor
market training causes unemployment to fall. The effect of expenditures on
labor market training is larger the higher unemployment benefits are. The
other instruments, public employment services and subsidized jobs, do not
reduce unemployment.
As this is in line with the predictions of the model, it suggests that indeed
the main effect of ALMP on unemployment works via the quality of the job
match and not via the job finding rate. Since training programs influence this
channel directly, they are most effective. Note, however, that we did not ana-
lyze the costs and benefits of these programs. It can still be the case that
although training programs reduce the unemployment rate, the benefits of
this do not outweigh the costs.
APPENDIX A: PROOFS OF THE RESULTS IN THE MAIN TEXT
Proof of Proposition 1 We derive here the results for the training subsidy σχ ,
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, hence a sufficient condi-









which holds because of the assumptions χ (0) = 0 and χ ′′ (e) > 0 as can be
seen as follows. Using a Taylor expansion we can write
χ (0)=χ (e)+χ ′ (e) (0− e)+ 1
2
χ ′′ (ζ ) (0− e)2 (26)
for some ζ ∈ 〈0, e〉. Since χ (0) = 0 and χ ′′ (·) > 0 we see that χ ′ (e) e > χ (e)
which is the required inequality.
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because ∂e∂σχ > 0. Hence the sign of
∂2e
∂b∂σχ is determined by three terms. The
first, is negative as ∂e∂b <0. The second and third are positive. A sufficient con-
dition for (b) to dominate (a) is that χ ′′′ (e) is big. unionsq
APPENDIX B: DATA
All data are from Bassanini and Duval (2006), where more details of the data
can be found. The following variables were used:
– Unemployment rate: Unemployed workers as share of the labor force, in
%; 25–54 age group.
– UB Replacement rate: Average unemployment benefit replacement rate
across two income situations (100 and 67% of average production worker
earnings), three family situations (single, with dependent spouse, with
spouse in work) and three different unemployment durations (first year,
second and third year, and fourth and fifth year of unemployment).
– Tax wedge: The wedge between the labor cost to the employer and the
corresponding net take-home pay of the employee for a single-earner cou-
ple with two children earning 100% of average production worker earn-
ings. The tax wedge expresses the sum of personal income tax and all
social security contributions as a percentage of total labor cost.
– Union density: Share of workers affiliated to a trade union, in %.
– Employment Protection Legislation: OECD summary indicator of the
stringency of Employment Protection Legislation.
– Level of wage bargaining: High degree of centralization/co-ordination of
the wage bargaining processes.
– ALMP: Public expenditures on active labor market programs per unem-
ployed worker as a share of GDP per capita.
– Training: Public expenditures on labor market training per unemployed
worker as a share of GDP per capita. Labor market training involves
training for unemployed adults and those at risk, training for employed
adults. The expenditures include both course costs and subsistence allow-
ances, but special training programs for youth and disabled are excluded.
– Subsidized jobs: Public expenditures on subsidized employment per unem-
ployed worker as a share of GDP per capita. Subsidized employment
concerns targeted measures to promote or provide employment for the
unemployed and other priority groups (but not youth and the disabled). It
also concerns wage subsidies paid to private sector firms to encourage the
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recruitment of targeted workers or continued employment of those whose
jobs are at risk and concerns support of unemployed persons starting
enterprizes and direct job creation (in public or non-profit organizations)
to benefit the unemployed.
– PES: Public expenditures on public employment services and administra-
tion per unemployed worker as a share of GDP per capita. The expendi-
tures concern placement, counseling and vocational guidance, job-search
courses, assistance with displacement costs, administering unemployment
benefits, all other administration costs of labor market agencies including
running labor market programs.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
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